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How We Think1
Alan H. SchoenfeldUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeley, CAUSAalans@berkeley.edu
Abstract2My main goal for this paper is to introduce a theory of decision-making – a theorythat provides a way of explaining how and why people make the decisions theydo, in the middle of complex activities such as teaching. My current researchhas evolved from my earlier problem solving work on problem solving (Schoenfeld,1985), so to set the stage for this discussion I will briefly describe that work – whatit showed, and the questions it did not answer. That will allow me to describe whata complete theory should be able to accomplish. I then turn to the main body ofthis paper, three studies of teaching. In those examples I show how, under certaincircumstances, it is possible to model the act of teaching, to the point where onecan provide a grounded explanation of every decision that a teacher makes duringan extended episode of teaching. Following that, I give some other examples toshow that the theory is general, and I make a few concluding comments.Key wordsProblem solving, decision-making, teaching.ResumenMi objetivo principal en este trabajo es presentar una teoría de la toma de de-cisiones - una teoría que proporciona una manera de explicar cómo y por quélas personas toman las decisiones que hacen, en medio de actividades complejascomo la docencia. Mi investigación actual ha evolucionado a partir de mi ante-rior trabajo en la solución del problema en resolución de problemas (Schoenfeld,1985), así, para preparar el escenario de esta discusión me referiré brevemente adicho trabajo –lo que mostró, y las preguntas que no respondió. Eso me permitirádescribir lo que una teoría completa debe ser capaz de lograr. Luego regreso a laparte principal de este trabajo, tres estudios en la enseñanza. En esos ejemplosse muestra cómo, en ciertas circunstancias, es posible modelar el acto de enseñar,hasta el punto en que se puede proporcionar una explicación bien fundada decada decisión que un maestro hace durante un episodio prolongado de enseñanza.Después de eso, doy otros ejemplos para demostrar que la teoría es general yhago algunas observaciones finales.Palabras claveResolución de problemas, toma de decisiones, enseñanza.
1 Este trabajo corresponde a una conferencia plenaria dictada en la XIII CIAEM, celebrada en Recife,Brasil el año 2011.2 El resumen y las palabras clave en español fueron agregados por los editores.
Cuadernos de Investigación y Formación en Educación Matemática. 2012. Año 7. Número 10. pp 135-149. Costa Rica
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136 Alan H. Schoenfeld
1. Introduction
I am honored to have been invited to give presentations at the XIII InteramericanConference on Mathematics Education (IACME XIII) and the International Seminar ofMathematics Education (SIEMAT III), and grateful to the organizers for inviting me. Itis a great pleasure to visit my friends and colleagues in Brazil and the Americas.These invitations provided me with a wonderful opportunity to set a personal goal.When Angel Ruiz and I first talked two years ago about my coming to Brazil, I wasworking on my book How We Think. I promised him – and myself – that I would beable to bring a published copy of the book to this conference, and that I would talkabout the book.I keep my promises! I am happy to say that the book How We Think now exists(Schoenfeld, 2010). Here is what I am going to discuss.
2. The Challenge
Suppose that you are in the middle of some “well-practiced” activity, something youhave done often so that it is familiar to you. Depending on who you are, it might be
- cooking a meal- fixing a car- teaching a class- doing medical diagnosis or brain surgery.
The challenge is this: If I know “enough” about you, can I explain (i.e., build a cognitivemodel that explains) every single action you take and every decision you make?My goal for this paper, and for my talk, is to describe an analytic structure that doesjust that – an analytic structure that explains how and why people act the way theydo, on a moment-by-moment basis, in the midst of complex, often social activities.My major claim is this:People’s in-the-moment decision making is a function of their knowledge and resources,goals, and beliefs and orientations. Their decisions and actions can be “captured”(explained and modeled) in detail using only these constructs.The main substance of this paper (as in the book) consists of three analyses of teaching,to convey the flavor of the work. Of course, it is no accident that I chose mathematicsteaching as the focal area for my analyses. I am, after all, a mathematics educator!But more to the point, teaching is a knowledge-intensive, highly interactive, dynamicactivity. If it is possible to validate a theory that explains teachers’ decision-makingin a wide range of circumstances, then that theory should serve to explain all wellpracticed behavior.
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How We Think 137
3. Background: Problem Solving
As I noted above, my current work is an outgrowth of my earlier research on mathe-matical problem solving. Here I want to summarize the “bottom lines” of that work, toshow how it lays the groundwork for my current research.My major argument about mathematical problem solving (see Schoenfeld, 1985, fordetail) was that it is possible to explain someone’s success or failure in trying to solveproblems on the basis of these 4 things:
1. Knowledge (or more broadly, resources). This is not exactly shocking – but,knowing what knowledge and resources a problem solver has potentially at hisor her disposal is important.2. Problem solving strategies, also known as “heuristics.” We know from Pólya’swork that mathematicians use such strategies, “rules of thumb for making progresswhen you do not know a direct way to a solution.” Faculty use them; they pickthem up by themselves, by experience. Typically, students don’t use them. But,my research showed that students can learn to use them.3. “Metacognition,” or “Monitoring and self-regulation.” Effective problem solversplan and keep track of how well things are going as the implement their plans.If they seem to be making progress, they continue; if there are difficulties, theyre-evaluate and consider alternatives. Ineffective problem solvers (including moststudents) do not do this. As a result, they can fail to solve problems that theycould solve. Students can learn to be more effective at these kinds of behaviors.4. Beliefs. Students’ beliefs about themselves and the nature of the mathemati-cal enterprise, derived from their experiences with mathematics, shape the veryknowledge they draw upon during problem solving and the ways they do or donot use that knowledge. For example, students who believe that “all problemscan be solved in 5 minutes or less” will stop working on problems even though,had they persevered, they might have solved them. Students who believe that“proof has nothing to do with discovery or invention” will, in the context of “dis-covery” problems, make conjectures that contradict results they have just proven.(See Schoenfeld, 1985).
In sum: By 1985 we know what “counted” in mathematical problem solving, in thesense that we could explain, post hoc, what accounted for success or failure. As theensuing 25 years have shown, this applied to all “goal-oriented” or problem solvingdomains, including mathematics, physics, electronic trouble-shooting, and writing.BUT. . . There was a lot that this framework I have just described didn’t do. In theresearch I conducted for Mathematical Problem Solving, people worked in isolation onproblems that I gave them to solve. Thus,
The goals were established (i.e., “solve this problem”).The tasks didn’t change while people worked on them.Social interactions and considerations were negligible.
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138 Alan H. Schoenfeld
In addition, MPS offered a framework, not a theory. Above and beyond pointing outwhat is important – that is what a framework does – a theory should provide rigorousexplanations of how and why things fit together. That is what my current work isabout. What I have been working on for the past 25 years is a theoretical approachthat explains:
how and why people make the choices they do,while working on issues they care about and have some experience with,amidst dynamically changing social environments.
I can think of no better domain to study than teaching. Teaching is knowledge-intensive.It calls for instant decision-making in a dynamically changing environment. It’s highlysocial. And if you can model teaching, you can model just about anything! I will arguethat if you can model teaching, you can model: shopping; preparing a meal; an ordinaryday at work; automobile mechanics; brain surgery (or any other medical practice), andother comparably complex, “well practiced” behaviors. All of these activities involvegoal-oriented behavior – drawing on available resources (not the least of which isknowledge) and making decisions in order to achieve outcomes you value.The goal of my work, and this paper, is to describe a theoretical architecture thatexplains people’s decision-making during suh activities.
4. How Things Work
My main theoretical claim is that goal-oriented “acting in the moment” – includingproblem solving, tutoring, teaching, cooking, and brain surgery – can be explained andmodeled by a theoretical architecture in which the following are represented: Resources(especially knowledge); Goals; Orientations (an abstraction of beliefs, including values,preferences, etc.); and Decision-Making (which can be modeled as a form of subjectivecost-benefit analysis). For substantiation, in excruciating detail, please see my book,How we Think. To briefly provide substantiation I will provide three examples in whatfollows. But first, a top-level view of how things work is given in Figure 1. The basicstructure is recursive: Individuals orient to situations and decide (on the basis of beliefsand available resources) how to pursue their goals. If the situation is familiar, theyimplement familiar routines; if things are unfamiliar or problematic, they reconsider. Itmay seem surprising, but if you know enough about an individual’s resources, goals,and beliefs, this approach allows you to model their behavior (after a huge amount ofwork!) on a line-by-line basis.
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How We Think 139
How Things WorkAn individual enters into a particular context with a specific body of resources, goals, andorientations.The individual takes in and orients to the situation. Certain pieces of information andknowledge become salient and are activated.Goals are established (or reinforced if they pre-existed).Decisions consistent with these goals are made, consciously or unconsciously, regardingwhat directions to pursue and what resources to use:– If the situation is familiar, then the process may be relatively automatic, where theaction(s) taken are in essence the access and implementation of scripts, frames, routines,or schemata.– If the situation is not familiar or there is something non-routine about it, then decision-making is made by a mechanism that can be modeled by (i.e., is consistent withthe results of ) using the subjective expected values of available options, given theorientations of the individual.Implementation begins.Monitoring (whether effective or not) takes place on an ongoing basis.This process is iterative, down to the level of individual utterances or actions:– Routines aimed at particular goals have sub-routines, which have their own subgoals;– If a subgoal is satisfied, the individual proceeds to another goal or subgoal;– If a goal is achieved, new goals kick in via decision-making;– If the process is interrupted or things don’t seem to be going well, decision-makingkicks into action once again. This may or may not result in a change of goals and/orthe pathways used to try to achieve them.
Figure 1. How things work, in outline. From Schoenfeld (2010), p. 18, with permission
5. First Teaching Example, Mark Nelson
Mark Nelson is a beginning teacher. In an elementary algebra class, Nelson hasworked through problems like, x5/x3 = ? Now he has assigned(a) m6/m2, (b) x3y7/x2y6, and (c) x5/x5for the class to work. Nelson expects the students to have little trouble with m6/m2 andx3y7/x2y6, but to be “confused” about x5/x5; he plans to “work through” their confusion.Here is what happens.Nelson calls on students to give answers to the first two examples. He has a straight-forward method for doing so:
He asks the students what they got for the answer, and confirms that it is correct;he asks how they got the answer;and then he elaborates on their responses.
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140 Alan H. Schoenfeld
Thus, for example, when a student says the answer to problem (b) is xy, Nelson asks“why did you get xy?” When the student says that he subtracted, Nelson asks, “Whatdid you subtract? When the student says “3 minus 2,” Nelson elaborates:“OK. You looked at the x’s [pointing to x-terms in numerator and denominator] and[pointing to exponents] you subtracted 3 minus 2. That gave you x to the first [writesx on the board]. And then [points to y terms] you looked at the y’s and said [points tothe exponents] 7 minus 6, gives you y to the first [writes y on board].”He then asks what to do with x5/x5. They expand and “cancel.” The board showsx5x5 = x/x/x/x/x/x/x/x/x/x/ . Pointing to that expression, he says, “what do I have?” The responsesare:“zero,” “zip,”, “nada,” “nothing” . . . not what he wants them to see! He tries variousways to get the students to see that “canceling” results in a “1”, for example,Nelson: “What’s 5/5?”Students: “1.”Nelson: “But I cancelled. If there’s a 1 there [in 5/5], isn’t there a 1 there [pointingto the cancelled expression]?”Students: “No.”Defeated, he slumps at the board while students argue there’s “nothing there.” He looksas if there is nothing he can say or do that will make sense to the students.
He tries again. He points to the expression x5x5 = x/x/x/x/x/x/x/x/x/x/ and asks what the answeris. A student says “x to the zero over 1.” Interestingly, Nelson mis-hears this as “x tothe zero equals 1,” which is the correct answer. Relieved, he tells the class,“That’s right. Get this in your notes: x5/x5 = x0 = 1.”“Any number to the zero power equals 1.”To put things simply, this is very strange. Nelson certainly knew enough mathematicsto be able to explain that if x 6=0,(x5x5
) = (xx )5 = 15 = 1,
but he didn’t do so. WHY?There is a simple answer, although it took us a long time to understand it. The issuehas to do with Nelson’s beliefs and orientations about teaching. One of Nelson’s centralbeliefs about teaching – the belief that the ideasyou discuss must be generated by thestudents – shaped what knowledge he did and did not use.In the first example above (reducing the fraction x3y7/x2y6, a student said he hadsubtracted. The fact that a student mentioned subtraction gave Nelson “permission” toexplain, which he did: “OK. You looked at the x’s and you subtracted 3 minus 2. Thatgave you x to the first. And then you looked at the y’s and said 7 minus 6, gives youy to the first.”
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How We Think 141
But in the case of example (c), x5/x5, he was stymied – when he pointed to theexpression x/x/x/x/x/x/x/x/x/x/ and asked “what do I have?” the only answers from the studentswere “zero”, “zip”, “nada” and “nothing.” Nobody said “1.” And because of his beliefthat he had to “build on” what students say, Nelson felt he could not proceed with theexplanation. Only later, when he mis-heard what a student said, was he able to finishup his explanation.[Note: This brief explanation may or may not seem convincing. I note that full detailis given in the book, and that Nelson was pat of the team that analyzed his videotape.So there is strong evidence that the claims I make here are justified.]
6. Second Teaching Example, Jim Minstrell
Here too I provide just a very brief description.Jim Minstrell is an award-winning teacher who is very thoughtful about his teaching.It is the beginning of the school year, and he is teaching an introductory lesson thatinvolves the use of mean, median, and mode. But, the main point of the lesson is thatMinstrell wants the students to see that such formulas need to be used sensibly.The previous day eight students measured the width of a table. The values:106.8; 107.0; 107.0; 107.5; 107.0; 107.0; 106.5; 106.0 cm.Nelson wants the students to discuss the “best number” to represent the width of thetable. His plan is for the lesson to have three parts:
1. Which numbers (all or some?) should they use?2. How should they combine them?3. With what precision should they report the answer?
Minstrell gave us a tape of the lesson, which we analyzed. The analysis proceededin stages. We decomposed the lesson into smaller and smaller “episodes,” noting foreach episode which goals were present, and observing how transitions correspondedto changes in goals. In this way, we decomposed the entire lesson – starting withthe lesson as a whole, and ultimately characterizing what happened on a line-by-linebasis. See Figures 2 and 3 (next pages) for an example of analytic detail. Figure 2shows the whole lesson, and the breaks it into major episodes (lesson segments), eachof which has its own internal structure. Most of the lesson was very simple to analyzein this way.Minstrell has a flexible “script” for each part of the lesson:He will raise the issue.He will ask the class for a suggestion.He will clarify and pursue the student suggestion by asking questions, insertingsome content if necessary.
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142 Alan H. Schoenfeld
Once this suggestion has been worked through, he will ask for more suggestions.When students run out of ideas, he will either inject more ideas or move to the nextpart of the lesson.
In this way, the lesson unfolds naturally, and it is easy to “capture” it – see Figure2 for a “top level” summary of how the lesson unfolded. The episodes in the secondand third columns, which correspond to an analysis of the lesson as taught, show thatMinstrell did cover the big topics as planned.In fact, a line-by-line analysis (See Schoenfeld, 1998; 2010) shows that when Minstrellwas engaged in dealing with expected subject matter, he followed the “script” describedabove very closely. So, it is easy to model Minstrell’s behavior when he is on familiarground.
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First Level ofParsing Second Level ofParsing Fourth Level ofParsing First five goals(See Legend) Orientations(See Legend)Third Level ofParsing Resources Decision-Making
Routine access to information aboutcourse.• Standard Routine implementation
• Interactive Elicitation
• Routine transitionExtensive content, pedagogical, and ped-agogical content knowledge as describedin narrative• Interactive Elicitation
• Routine transition
• Interactive Elicitation
Specific knowledge of weighted average, etc.• High priority to student initiative,student sense-making, etc.• Interactive Elicitation
• Mini-lecture to get point across
• Routine closure
[1] (1-517)
The EntireLesson
This discomposeinto four mainepisodes, whosestructure iselaborated in theboxes to the right.
[1.1] (1-3)Introduction andAdministrativeBusinessGoals: Provide awarm, positiveatmosphere; getclass discussionrolling ...Form: “Teachertalk‘ introductionfollowed byQ-&-A exchange.
[1.2] (4-137)“Best Number“This is the firstmain contentdiscussion of thelesson. It breaksinto the maincomponents seento the immediateright - whichnumbers count,and how shouldthey be combined?The goals are tohave the students(re)-generate thecontent, and toreprise it thoro-ughly in a discus-sion that involvesthem as activeparticipants.Form: Interactiveelicitation.
Form: Interactiveteacher-leddiscussion whitreflective tosses.
[1.4] (164)Homework As-signment; the Bell
[1.1.1] (1A)IntroductoryWelcome
[1.1.2] (1BCD)Announcing theDay´s Agenda
[1.1.3] (1E-3)Taking andAnsweringQuestions
[1.1.4] (3C)Fork / Closure
[1.2.1] (4-26)Which NumbersCount, With WhatJustification?Goals and Form:Inherited from 1.2.
[1.2.2] (27-112)Having Chosenthe NumbersThat Count, HowDo You Computethe Best Value?Goals and Form:Inherited from 1.2.
Error TermGoals, Form: See1.3.[1.3.3] (162-163)Wrap-up Speechon “Precision“
[1.2.1.1] (4)(Re-)Establishing theContext for Discussion
[1.2.1.2] (5-26)Discussion Methods ofChoosing Numbers
[1.2.1.3] (26)Fork / Closure
[1.2.2.1] (27-33)Method 1: Compout-ing the Arithmetic Av-erage of the NumbersSelected
[1.2.2.2] (34-39A)Method 2: Mode[1.2.2.3] (39B-99A)Major Unplanned Dis-cussionExploring a student‘sproposed method
[1.3.2.3] (162)Summary
..... The transcript and parsing continue along these lines .....
Goal Legend (corresponding to the partial list of goals represented above)a. Have the class interact as a community of inquiry, whit freedom to explore, conjecture, reasonthings through.b. Have students experience physics as a way of making sense of the world.c. Provide a warm, positive atmosphere in which students feel valued, encouraged to speak, etc.d. Deal with administrivia.e. Provide information about the day´s activities.
Orientation Legend (corresponding to the orientations representedabove)A. Doing physics is and should be seen as a sense-making activity.B. Where possible, ideas should come from students.C. Class discourse structures should minimize teacher “telling.´´.D. Student sense-making initiative should be given highest priority
Figure 2. A “top level” view of Minstrell’s lesson, “unfolding” in levels of detail. (With permission,from Schoenfeld, 2010, pp. 96-97)
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How We Think 143
But what about unusual events? Remember the data: The eight values the studentshad obtained for the width of the table were106.8; 107.0; 107.0; 107.5; 107.0; 107.0; 106.5; 106.0 cm.As the lesson unfolded, Minstrell asked the students about “a way of getting thebest value.” (See box 1.2.2 in the third column of Figure 2.) As the class proceeded,one student mentioned the idea of using the “average” and, when asked by Minstrell,provided a definition. (Box 1.2.2.1 in the fourth column of Figure 2.) Another studentmentioned mode (Box 1.2.2.2). Then, a student said:“This is a little complicated but I mean it might work. If you see that 107 shows up4 times, you give it a coefficient of 4, and then 107.5 only shows up one time, yougive it a coefficient of one, you add all those up and then you divide by the number ofcoefficients you have.”This is an unexpected comment, which does not fit directly with Minstrell’s flexiblescript. The question is, can we say what Minstrell would do when something unex-pected, like this, arises in the middle of his lesson?Before proceeding, I want to point out that there is a wide range of responses, whichteachers might produce. I have seen responses like all of the following:
– “That’s a very interesting question. I’ll talk to you about it after class.”– “Excellent question. I need to get through today’s plans so you can do tonight’sassigned homework, but I’ll discuss it tomorrow.”– “That’s neat. What you’ve just described is known as the ‘weighted average.’ Letme briefly explain how you can work with that. . . ”– “Let me write that up as a formula and see what folks think of it.”– “Let’s make sure we all understand what you’ve suggested, and then explore it.”
So, teachers might do very different things. Is it possible to know what Minstrell willdo? According to our model of Minstrell,His fundamental orientation toward teaching is that physics is a sense-makingactivity and that students should experience it as such.One of his major goals is to support inquiry and to honor student attempts atfiguring things out.His resource base includes favored techniques such as “reflective tosses” – askingquestions that get students to explain/elaborate on what they said.Thus, the model predicts that he will pursue the last option – making sure that thestudents understand the issue that the student has raised (including the ambiguityabout how you add the coefficients; do you divide by 5 or 8?) and pursuing it. He willdo so by asking the students questions and working with the ideas they produce.This is, in fact, what Minstrell did. Figure 3 shows how that segment of the lessonevolved. It is an elaboration of Box 1.2.2.3 in Figure 2.
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144 Alan H. Schoenfeld
[1.2.2.3] (39B-99A)Mayor Unplanned Excursion:Exploration of an alternative formulafor arithmetic averageInitiating event (trigger):A student suggests an idea that “is alittle complicated“ but “might work.“Beliefs:• Teacher should follow student‘s leadin thinking where appropriate.• Content is relevant and appropriate.Goals:• All overarching goals are active (seenarrative).• Explore and clarify the propertiesof the student‘s proposed formula.• Have content emerge from studentsif possible.• Note: Second goal especially isemergent (unplanned).Method/action plan:• Interactive elicitation using reflec-tive tosses.Episode type:• As above, interactive elicitation )afamiliar classroom routine).Knowledge base:• Immediate recognition and under-standing of proposed student formula.• Memory of which students were fa-miliar whit which ideas.Terminating event:• Satisfactory elaboration of student‘smethod and comparison whit standardand alternative methods.Note: This entire episode was un-planned. The time and effort spent onit reflect Minstrell‘s commitment to thegoal of taking student ideas seriouslyand pursuing them where possible.
[1.2.2.3.2] (77-99A)
Impromptu Excursion:Comparing “weighted“and “unweighted“ formulasfor the average
Initiating event:• Student comment about possibleconfusion between the two formulas.Beliefs, goals, method, and episodetype are all as identified in Episode1.2.2.3.Specific content goal:• Clarify the difference between thetwo formulas.Terminating event:• The specific content goal immedi-ately above is achieved.
[1.2.2.3.1] (39A-76)
Impromptu Excursion:Comparing the nature ofa “complicated“ formulaproposed by student
Initiating event, beliefs, goals, method,and episode type are all as identifiedin Episode 1.2.2.3.Specific content goal:• Have students come to conclusionthat the “complicated“ formula yieldsthe arithmetic average.Terminating event:• The specific content goal immedi-ately above is achieved.
[1.2.2.3.2.3] (87-99A)Framing and Clarifyingthe ComparisonSpecific (emergent) content goal:•Work through compelling example tomake sure the difference is understood.Method:• Interactive elicitation using reflec-tive tosses.Terminating event:• Content goal clearly achieved;teacher summarizes whit mini-lecture.
[1.2.2.3.2.2] (78-86)Framing and Clarifyingthe ComparisonSpecific (emergent) content goal:• Make sure the issue is clear to stu-dents.Method:• Interactive elicitation using reflec-tive tosses.Terminating event:• Student consensus (by assertion)they are not the same - goal achieved.
[1.2.2.3.2.1] (77)Student Comment
[1.2.2.3.1.3] (26B-76)Showing the “Complicated“Formula is theArithmetic AverageSpecific content goal:• Have class conclude the formulasare the same.Method:• Interactive elicitation calling on aspecific student to prove content.Terminating event:• The content goal is achieved.
[1.2.2.3.1.2] (41-62A)Clarifying What theStudent SuggestedSpecific (emergent) content goal:• Make sure the class understandsthe nature of the proposed formula.Method:• Interactive elicitation using reflec-tive tosses.Terminating event:• The content goal is achieved.
[1.2.2.3.1.1] (39A-40)Student Comment
NoteThe next level of detail,which shows Minstrell‘s useof interactive elicitation toachieve the goals specified inepisodes[1.2.2.3.1.2],[1.2.2.3.1.3],[1.2.2.3.2.2], and[1.2.2.3.2.3],is not given here.This is just to save space.The analysis is straightfor-ward.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
Figure 3. A more fine-grained parsing of Episode [1.2.2.3]. (From Schoenfeld, 2010, pp. 116-117,with permission.)
As noted above, it is possible to model Minstrell’s decision, and showing that of theoptions listed above, he is by far most likely to pursue the one I have indicated. Thecomputations take about 7 pages of text, so I will spare you the detail!More generally, we have found that:We were able to capture Minstrell’s routine decision-making, on a line-by-line basis,by characterizing his knowledge/resources and modeling them as described in Figure 1,“How Things Work;” and,We were able to model Minstrell’s non-routine decision-making using a form of sub-jective expected value computation, where we considered the various alternatives andlooked at how consistent they were with Minstrell’s beliefs and values (his orientations).In summary, we were able to model every decision Minstrell made during the hour-longclass.
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7. Third Teaching Example, Deborah Ball
Some years ago, at a meeting, Deborah Ball showed a video of a third grade classroomlesson she had taught. The lesson was amazing – and it was controversial. In it,
– Third graders argued on solid mathematical grounds.– The discussion agenda evolved as a function of classroom conversations.– The teacher seemed at times to play a negligible role, and she made at leastone decision that people said didn’t make sense.
In addition, I had little or no intuition about what happened. Thus, this was a perfecttape to study! There were major differences from cases 1 and 2:
– the students were third graders instead of high school students– psychological (developmental) issues differed because of the children’s age– the “control structure” for the classroom was much more “organic”– the teacher played a less obvious “directing” role.
The question was, could I model what happened in this lesson? If so, then the theorycovered an extremely wide range of examples, so there would be compelling evidenceof its general validity. If not, then I would understand the limits of the theory. (Perhaps,for example, it would only apply to teacher-directed lessons at the high school level.)Here is what happened during the lesson. Ball’s third grade class had been studyingcombinations of integers, and they had been thinking about the fact that, for example,the sum of two even numbers always seemed to be even. The previous day Ball’sstudents had met with some 4th graders, to discuss the properties of even numbers,odd numbers, and zero. Ball had wanted her students to see that these were complexissues and that even the “big” fourth graders were struggling with them. The day afterthe meeting (the day of this lesson), Ball started the class by asking what the studentsthought about the meeting:
– How do they think about that experience?– How do they think about their own thinking and learning?
Ball had students come up to the board to discuss “what they learned from the meeting.”The discussion (a transcript of which is given in full in Schoenfeld, 2008, and Schoenfeld,2010) covered a lot of territory, with Ball seemingly playing a small role as studentsargued about the properties of zero (is it even? odd? “special”?). For the most part,Ball kept her students on the “meta-level” question: what did they learn about theirown thinking from the meeting with the fourth graders the previous day?But then, after a student made a comment, Ball interrupted him to ask a mathematicalquestion about the student’s understanding. This question, which took almost 3 minutes
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146 Alan H. Schoenfeld
to resolve, completely disrupted the flow of the lesson. Many people, when watching thetape of the lesson, call that decision a “mistake.” How could Ball, who is a very careful,thoughtful, and experienced teacher, do such a thing? If the decision was arbitrary orcapricious in some way, that is a problem for the theory. If highly experienced teachersmake arbitrary decisions, it would be impossible to model teachers’ decision making ingeneral.To sum up, this part of the lesson seems to unfold without Ball playing a directiverole in its development – and she made an unusual decision to interrupt the flow ofconversation. Can this be modeled?The answer is yes. A fine-grained analysis reveals that Ball has a “debriefing routine”that consists of asking questions and fleshing out answers. That routine is given inFigure 4.
Figure 4. A flexible, interruptible routine for discussing a topic (from Schoenfeld, 2010, p. 129,with permission).
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In fact, Ball uses that routine five times in the first six minutes of class (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Ball’s use of the routine in the lesson segment (from Schoenfeld, 2010, pp. 136-152,with permission).Moreover, once you understand Ball’s plans for the lesson, her unexpected decision (her“mistake” can be seen as entirely reasonable and consistent with her agenda. Thishas been modeled in great detail. For the full analysis, see Schoenfeld, 2010; for ananalytic diagram showing the full analysis, download Appendix E from my web page:http://www-gse.berkeley.edu/faculty/AHSchoenfeld/AHSchoenfeld.html.To sum things up: As in the two previous cases,We were able to model Ball’s routine decision-making, on a line-by-line basis, bycharacterizing her knowledge/resources and modeling them as described in the slide“How Things Work.”We were able to model Ball’s non-routine decision-making as a form of subjectiveexpected value computation.In short, we were able to model every move Ball made during the lesson segment.
8. Yet More Examples
Making Breakfast (or any other meal)If you look at Figure 1, you can see that it would be easy to model decision-makingduring cooking. Usually we have fixed routines for cooking familiar meals. And ifsomething changes (for example, when my daughter asks me to make a fancy breakfast),that calls for a “non-routine” decision, which can also be modeled.
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Routine medical diagnosis and practiceTo see if my ideas worked outside of the classroom, I asked my doctor if I could tapeand analyze one of my office visits with her. She said yes, and an analysis of ourconversation is given in the book. The conversation was easy to model, because shefollows a straightforward (and flexible) script. Modeling a two-person interaction is alot easier than modeling a classroom; it is more like modeling a tutoring interaction.When the teacher only has to pay attention to one other person (instead of 30), decision-making is comparatively simple (and simple to model).I should note that there is a very large artificial intelligence literature on modelingdoctors’ decision making – there are computer programs that make diagnoses, etc. (Thefield is well established: see, e.g., Clancey & Shortliffe, 1984.) So, the idea that it ispossible to capture doctors’ routine decision making is not new. More recent, and alsoconsistent with my emphasis on beliefs as shaping behavior, there are studies (e.g.,Groopman, 2007) of how doctors’ stereotypes (orientations) regarding patient behaviorlead them to miss what should be straightforward diagnoses.In Sum:The approach I have outlined in this paper “covers”:
– Routine and non-routine problem solving– Routine and non-routine teaching– Cooking– Brain surgery
and every other example of “well-practiced,” knowledge-based behavior that I can thinkof. All told, I believe it works pretty well as a theory of “how we think.”Readers have the right to ask, why would someone spend 25 years trying to build andtest a theory like this? Here is my response.First, theory building and testing should be a central part of the research enterprise.That is how we make progress.Second, the more we understand something the better we can make it work. When weunderstand how something skillful is done we can help others do it.Third, this approach has the potential to provide tools for describing developmentaltrajectories of teachers. In that way, we can think about how best to help teachers getbetter at helping their students learn. (See Chapter 8 of Schoenfeld, 2010.)Finally, its fun! The challenge of understanding human behavior has occupied me forthe past 35 years, and I am happy to continue working on it.
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